Also worth pointing out, that Ukraine have learned lessons, they don't have any large formations, with the possible exceptions of specific assaults like the other night around Kherson; and then they dissipate again ASAP to avoid exposing themselves to thermobarics.Sandydragon wrote: ↑Mon Oct 03, 2022 9:10 am If tactical nukes are to be used, then it would be against large Ukrainian formations with a view to occupying the ground once regular troops had finished them off. But if the Russian army can't advance onto radioactive ground then a tactical nuke becomes pointless, other than as a petulant gesture.
There's no military- strategic advantage to Putin for using a tactical nuke. And even if there were, Russia wouldn't be able to actually capitalise on it (as you said). A strategic nuke will probably see the Black Sea Fleet destroyed, and ICBMs hitting any large concentration of Russian ammunition or manpower, possibly including in Russia itself; with Ukraine getting more HIMARS, and more equipment of every sort; and a very strong chance of NATO militaries allowing their soldiers to go off to Ukraine if they so wish.
The only advantage I can see for Putin using a tactical Nuke is that it gives him an optics off-ramp of being defeated by NATO rather than being defeated by Ukraine.
Do anything other that a tactical nuke, and he's inviting a nuclear response and the loss of any remaining allies (probably including N Korea).
ETA: Sorry, I CAN think of a situation where it might benefit Putin to use tactical Nukes - and that's for when his defensive line is breached, either by assault, or beachhead - then irradiating the area may prevent Ukraine from flooding in through it and getting behind his defences.
That... doesn't seem like a sane option in a world where wind exist, and his own troops would be, by definition, remarkably close to the detonation site - and would also require pretty rapid deployment, and accuracy, in a way that Russia has shown itself to be incapable of for conventional warheads.